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Preface 
 
This paper «Food Safety at Stake – the Establishment of Food Agencies», is written as 
part of a broader research project comparing food control systems and regulation of risk 
in food. Studies of regulation and food control have for many years been a field of 
research at The Rokkan Centre and the former Centre for Social Science Research 
(SEFOS) at the University of Bergen. This research includes works about the history 
and institutionalization of food control in Norway, as well as studies of the current 
practise within the control systems. From 1999 a comparative research project was 
included. The comparative project focuses on food control in four European countries, 
England, Sweden, Germany and The Netherlands, and the relations between the 
national food control and the European food control regulations. This paper – 
concentrating on the agencies, FSA in Britain and EFSA at European level, is written by 
researcher Lise Hellebø. This paper will be developed to be included in her thesis for 
the doctoral degree in political science.   
 
 
Kari Tove Elvbakken 
Director  
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Summary 
Food safety regulation has a long history in public policy. It is an essential and valued 
state responsibility, vital in securing society order. The 1990s BSE-crisis had important 
political, institutional and economic consequences, and can explain recent institutional 
and political changes in the food policy field. New regulation, new organisation and new 
food agencies were established – existing ones were reorganized. Here, the 
establishment of the Food Standards Agency in Great Britain and the European Food 
Safety Authority in the EU is compared. Central policy documents are analysed in order 
to assess characteristics of the agencies and British and EU food safety policy. Central 
motivations include independence, scientific excellence and transparency. The desire to 
restore consumer confidence in food regulation and in regulating institutions is 
significant. Furthering European integration was an essential additional goal within the 
EU. The documents reveal a sincere interest in changing institutions, policy and 
regulation. At the same time, existing institutional arrangements and traditions continue 
to influence the field. 
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Sammendrag 
Offentlig regulering av mat har en lang historie. Det er en viktig og verdifull oppgave 
for staten, og en av statens sentrale ordensoppgaver. Notatet viser hvordan BSE-
skandalen på 1990-tallet fikk viktige politiske, institusjonelle og økonomiske 
konsekvenser, og argumenterer for at dette kan forklare institusjonelle og politiske 
endringer i matpolitikken. Ny lovgivning, ny organisering av forvaltningen og nye 
matvaremyndigheter ble etablert i kjølvannet av skandalen. Samtidig ble eksisterende 
myndigheter omorganisert. Her sammenliknes etableringen av Food Standards Agency i 
Storbritannia og European Food Safety Authority i EU. Sentrale policy-dokumenter er 
analysert med sikte på å finne viktige kjennetegn ved etableringen av de to nyoprettede 
myndighetene og ved matpolitikken generelt. Analysen viser at tre målsettinger var 
særlig viktige: Uavhengighet, vitenskapelig ekspertise og åpenhet i forvaltningen. Målet 
om å gjenopprette forbrukertillit til både bestemmelsene og til regulerende institusjoner 
er også sentralt. I tillegg var det et viktig mål i EU-sammenheng å bidra til den 
europeiske integrasjonen. Dokumentene som er analysert vitner om et oppriktig ønske 
om å endre institusjoner, politikk og regulering. Samtidig fortsetter eksisterende 
institusjonelle ordninger og tradisjoner å forme feltet.  
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Food Safety at Stake – the 
Establishment of Food Agencies 
An increase in public awareness concerning food safety has been associated with recent 
series of food scares across Europe. It is said that consumer confidence in food 
controlling institutions has been seriously weakened. Correspondingly, widespread 
changes have been made in the ways food control is organised, and new agencies have 
been created. The consumer health magazine Consumer Voice1 characterises this as «…an 
outbreak of new agencies», adding that «The official control agencies have regrouped in the battle to 
regain public confidence. Food inspectors and food scientists have been re-examining and re-defining their 
roles» (Consumer Voice 2000:28). 
This article compares and examines the establishment of two new food agencies: The 
Food Standards Agency – FSA – in Great Britain and The European Food Safety Authority – 
EFSA – in the European Union (EU). Both were established after a serious food 
scandal had ridden Europe: the mad cow disease, or the BSE crisis.2 Central to the 
analysis is a comparison of the two agencies, the processes leading to their establishment 
and the motivations and aims governing them. 
The two agencies are placed at different analytical and administrative levels. The FSA 
operates primarily nationally, whereas EFSA operates at the European level. This might 
create methodological problems. The agencies are faced with different tasks and 
different problems because they are placed at different levels. At the same time they 
operate within the same policy field, and therefore have many similarities both of 
structure and mission. The fact that they both were created in the immediate wake of 
the BSE crisis makes them particular interesting in a comparative perspective. An 
important aim is to give some characteristics of food policy at the beginning of our 
century. A focus on two governing levels is therefore an advantage whereas it gives a 
broader perspective. 
In the following, I will introduce a historical and institutional approach, and address 
the importance of crisis as a catalyst for change. Then, I introduce and discuss a 
selection of works that can be seen as representative for academic literature on public 
agencies. We look at how public agencies are understood and analysed, nationally and 
within the EU framework. This establishes a theoretical foundation illuminating the 
following empirical sections. The next part of the article gives a brief account of the 
BSE crisis, illuminating events both in Great Britain and in the EU. Further, an 
empirical account of the establishment of the two agencies is presented. Here, central 
policy documents are systematically analysed in a discussion of the most significant 
motivations governing the agencies. Finally, a brief discussion sums up the main 
                                                 
1 Consumer Voice is published by the European Commission, General Directorate of Health and Consumer 
Protection. 
2 BSE: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy. A disease of cattle which it is believed can be transmitted to humans and 
cause a new variant of the brain disease Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease (nvCJD). 
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findings. The assessments are based on qualitative analysis of relevant policy documents 
listed in Table 1 following. Four interviews with five informants in the FSA, the 
Department of Health (DoH), the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) 
and the EU Commission, carried out in 1999 and 2000, have further informed the 
analysis.3 
Institutions, regulation, crisis, and 
change 
Four concepts are crucial in the following account: institutions, regulation, crisis and 
change. Food safety regulation and food control is understood in institutional terms. It 
is seen as an institutionalized policy field, involving certain characteristics, based in 
distinctive institutions, comprising traditions and values formed over time. The role of 
sudden crisis in stimulating the formation of new institutional arrangements is central. 
The characteristics of the regulation subject – food safety – surfaces as an important 
factor explaining similarities in the two agencies. At the same time, existing institutional 
arrangements, nationally and at the EU level, can explain differences. A crisis can alter 
policy and change fundamental institutional and regulative arrangements. Here, it will be 
argued that BSE played a crucial part in the changes of the British and EU food control 
and the subsequent setting up of food agencies. 
The relevance of understanding food control as a particular form of regulation with a 
specific history and its own institutions has been argued in a work on food control in 
Norway (Elvbakken 1997). Elvbakken shows that regulation of food and food control is 
an important undertaking of the state, a task that is of essential value for society. To 
secure safe food and adequate food supplies is also to secure order. Consequently, a 
crisis that challenges food safety arrangements challenges the state and society order. 
Food safety involves public health and safety issues, but also includes market and 
business interests. It involves both political and economic issues. It may also involve 
ethical concerns and question production methods. Securing safe food is an essential 
task for any state, regardless of state form and political system. A food safety crisis may 
therefore challenge the state itself, and further question arrangements in several 
different policy areas. 
Elvbakken argues the usefulness of Selznick’s definition of regulation (Elvbakken 
1997:8). He describes regulation as «…sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency 
over activities that are socially valued» (Selznick 1985:363–364). Majone discusses regulation 
in Europe and also refers to the value of Selznick’s definition (Majone 1996a:9). This 
understanding of regulation brings the regulating institution or agency into focus, and 
emphasises the significance of embedded social values. It also emphasises food safety as 
an essential and valued task taken care of by the state. Selznick’s approach to regulation 
                                                 
3 Data has been collected in a research project funded by the Norwegian Research Council («Offentlig håndtering av risiko 
ved mat – en sammenliknende studie av bruk av virkemidler»). The study compares food control and food policy in 
Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. 
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has been used both at a national level (Elvbakken’s study) and a European level 
(Majone’s work), and is therefore considered relevant here. 
From an institutional approach (Peters 1999, Powell and DiMaggio 1991, Scott 
1995), food regulation and food control can be seen as reflecting certain norms, values 
and objectives, which are embodied in certain institutions formed over time and in 
different contexts. Different food agencies can be expected to show important 
similarities and to face similar challenges. At the same time, they are likely to be 
influenced by national and specific institutional contexts. Elvbakken emphasises the 
importance of history in understanding food control, whereas food control is a policy 
field that has been institutionalized over time and with particular characteristics 
(Elvbakken 1997). A historical institutional outlook emphasises the importance of 
historical context in trying to understand important institutions (Thelen 1999, Thelen 
and Steinmo 1992). This is relevant when trying to understand institutions that deal with 
food control.  
Historical institutionalists use a definition of institutions that includes both formal 
and informal rules and procedures that influence and shape politics and political history 
as well as behaviour. These range from specific characteristics of government 
institutions to the more overarching structures of the state and the nations normative 
social order (Thelen and Steinmo 1992:2). Institutionalists are frequently criticised for an 
alleged concentration on continuity and stability rather than on patterns and 
mechanisms of change (Peters 1999). However, many institutionalists recognize this, 
and are very much engaged in theorizing about institutional development and change. 
Thelen and Steinmo (1992) and Thelen (1999) encourage a search for more theorizing 
on institutional formation and change. A suggested way forward is to employ more 
comparative studies. They draw attention to what they call ‘institutional dynamism’; 
where changes in context produce situations where old institutions change and new 
institutions might arise. Crisis (political, institutional and/or economical) can be an 
important explanatory for institutional and political change. The BSE crisis represents 
an event that can be seen to have spurred ‘institutional dynamism’ in the field of food 
policy. By comparing the processes in the creation of the FSA in Great Britain and 
EFSA in the EU, this argument will be further explained. 
A conception of crisis as catalyst for change is common to institutional theories 
(Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996). Krasner (1984:234) conceptualizes institutional change 
as «…episodic and dramatic rather than continuous and incremental» – as ‘punctuated 
equilibrium’. This implies that the development of institutions is characterized by rapid 
change during periods of crisis, followed by long periods of consolidation and stasis. 
According to Krasner, the natural order is for institutions to perpetuate themselves 
(path dependency). Crisis is a result of changes in society, of incongruence between the 
state and its environment. External or internal pressures lead to instances of ‘punctuated 
equilibrium’ in the relation between the state and the society.4 Path dependency suggests 
                                                 
4 March and Olsen (1989:167–168) have challenged this view of state-society relations: Viewing institutions as an 
equilibrium solution to conflicting interests does not take in the totality of what institutions are. Institutions embed 
historical experience, rules and routines that are something more than a reflection of the current political and social 
forces in a society. This approach agrees with the work of Selznick and with the historical institutional approach. 
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that organizations will go on behaving the same way as before where the costs of exit 
rise over time (Pierson 2000). Therefore, it is difficult to introduce new arrangements. 
Path dependency does not rule out institutional change, but argues that change tends to 
be incremental and mediocre rather than sudden and radical. Nevertheless, if a crisis is 
extensive enough, involving profound challenges to the existing order, institutional 
changes can be more far-reaching than the minor adjustments a ‘normal’ path 
dependent situation would suggest. Fligstein and Mara-Drita (1996) elaborate on the 
role of crisis in institution-building. They argue that institution-building moments occur 
when a social, economic or political crisis undermines the current institutional 
arrangements. In a crisis, institutional entrepreneurs can seize the moment and try to 
forge new agreements. Boin and t’Hart (2003) similarly explore the notion that crises 
provide key opportunities for institutional reform, but argue that opportunities for 
reform in the wake of a crisis are smaller than often thought. The case of BSE, however, 
is seen as a crisis of such scope that it did entail a significant bureaucratic reform craft 
(Boin and t’Hart 2003:549). Taking heed of crisis as a formative craft opens up for a 
view of institutions as both enabling and constraining development (see for instance 
Pierson 2000).  
In order to fully understand the mechanisms of change and the events following a 
crisis, it is important to look into the policy field in question. In order to understand the 
events, it is necessary to understand the characteristics of the field as well, including 
institutions, their history and inherent values. In agreement with the work of Selznick, 
Stinchcombe (1997) points to the importance of values in institutions. The embodiment 
of important values represents the legitimizing capacity for the institution in question. 
People accept and support existing institutions because they in some way embody a 
value that people embrace. The insitution’s ability to realize such values determines its 
‘life’ and how well it does. If the legitimacy of an institution is at stake, the institution 
itself is challenged. Subsequently, a legitimacy crisis that challenges the inherent value(s) 
of an institution in particular holds potential for institutional change. Herein lies the 
explosive force of the BSE crisis. 
Identifying agencies 
The term ‘agency’, although commonly used in relation to national food administrations, 
is somewhat ambiguous. Some food agencies are mainly enforcement and inspection 
bodies, others primarily provide advice to other governing institutions and/or perform 
scientific research and risk assessment. Different food agencies have different relations 
to central government, and sanctioning and regulative powers vary. The agency label 
therefore does not signify identical organisations, though they are likely to possess 
important similarities because they operate in the same policy field. 
The BSE crisis led to criticism based among other things on alleged confusion of 
politics and science, of vested interests and public health concerns. With the 
establishment of EFSA, scientific risk assessment was delegated to the agency, while 
more strategic policy decisions remained with the Commission. In the British case, the 
FSA deals mainly with management and advice to central government while legislation 
FOOD SAFETY AT  STAKE  … WORKING PAPER  15  -  2004  
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and more fundamental policy issues are dealt with by the Department of Health (DoH). 
This separation of administrative tasks and policy decisions can be seen as an important 
motivation behind the creation of new food agencies. 
Rhodes (1996) introduced the term agencification in studying the establishment of 
independent agencies in British administration in the seventies (the so-called Next Steps 
agencies). Since then, there has been a development of what may be characterised as 
agency literature in public administration. On the whole, the agency literature seeks to 
answer general questions about agencies, and many look for common features and focus 
on how to obtain optimal management (Pollitt 2003, Pollitt and Talbot 2004). Agencies 
are often seen as a distinctive type of public or state organisation, although most authors 
agree that they are difficult to define and categorize. Pollitt and Talbot (2004) bring on 
five criteria which are useful in the definition of agencies. First, the agency should be at 
arm’s length from the main departments of state, it should be carrying out public tasks 
at a national level, be staffed by public servants, financed by the state budget and subject 
to public/administrative law procedures (Talbot 2004:5). 
The establishment of agencies is commonly explained as motivated by the classic 
doctrine in public administration of separating policy from administration and 
management. Majone (1996a, 1996b, 1997, 2000) emphasises that by separating policy 
from administration through the establishment of agencies, the day-to-day 
administration and implementation of policy becomes more stable and predictable. As a 
result, regulation should become more credible. According to Rhodes (1996:7), the key 
notion behind agencification in Great Britain was that distance from central departments 
gave freedom to manage. With the establishment of agencies, responsibility for 
management is generally delegated to the agency while accountability for policy remains 
with the respective minister (Rhodes 1996:12).5 We shall see in the following account 
that establishing agencies as separate bodies in order to restore legitimacy and public 
confidence after the BSE crisis was an important motivating factor. 
EU agencies differ from national agencies but may also have similarities according to 
area of regulation. The agency term is seen as ambiguous at the EU level as well, and 
has been used for several bodies (Kreher 1997:227). At the same time, EU agencies in 
general share some similar characteristics. They are described in a Commission paper 
(EU 2000) and defined as: «…a public authority set up under European law, separate from the 
Community institutions (Council, Parliament, the Commission, Central Bank, etc.), and enjoying legal 
personality» (ibid. 4).6 
EU agencies are continually seen in relation to the development of the European 
Union and European integration. In a special issue of the Journal of European Public 
Policy (1997), Dehousse, Kreher, Majone and Shapiro discuss the establishment and 
functioning of agencies within the EU. They see the development of agencies in the EU 
as a response to conflicting pressures following the creation of the internal market – and 
in particular as a response to shortcomings in the existing regulatory approach of the 
                                                 
5 In the case of EU agencies, policy accountability as a rule remains with the responsible EU commissioner(s) (EU 
2000). 
6 The EU website lists 13 different agencies, among them EFSA. www.europa.eu.int/agencies/index_en.htm  
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European Commission (Dehousse 1997:246–247). They point out that EU agencies lack 
the independence and powers of other regulatory bodies, and are relatively ‘weaker’ than 
agencies in the US (Majone 1997:262, Shapiro 1997:276–282). This is also due to 
provisions of the Treaty of Rome – in particular Article 4 which enumerates the 
institutions of the EU. This article restricts the opportunity of freely establishing other 
regulatory bodies. Nevertheless, the four authors are generally optimistic regarding the 
potential and influence of European agencies. The establishment of (more) EU agencies 
is seen as an important step towards further European integration. 
Vos (2000b) considers the establishment of more (EU) agencies as advantageous, 
primarily because agencies facilitate the use of scientific and/or technical experts who 
are not part of the existing bureaucratic structure, and secondly because they reduce the 
administrative workload on central institutions, allowing the latter to concentrate on 
strategic policy-making. This line of argument is relevant at a national level as well. 
However, Vos warns that extreme ‘agencification’ could lead to more fragmentation, 
and erode accountability (Vos 2000b:1120). 
Majone argues that administrative or technocratic networks within EU agencies serve 
as important ‘bearers of reputation’ (Majone 1997:271). The establishment of networks 
facilitates the development of practices, which should create shared expectations. The 
establishment of an agency in a certain policy field (such as food safety) might help 
create a genuinely European policy in that particular field, and can result in further 
identification with the values and priorities of European policy. These aspects are 
relevant in the understanding of the establishment of EFSA. However, the existence of 
European or worldwide expert networks in the field of food safety is not new. One such 
network is the Codex Alimentarius Commission.7 Food experts have also long been 
united by the existing committee system of the EU. Another established network is 
FLEP, a forum uniting European food law enforcement practitioners.  
Pollitt (2003) and Pollitt and Talbot (2004) point out that a universal legal 
classification of agencies is difficult because national systems differ. At the same time 
functional classifications are hard to standardize because ‘framing’ constitutions and 
political systems vary. However, I would argue that agencies operating in the same 
policy field – such as food control – can be expected to enjoy certain similarities across 
countries and institutional boundaries because of their similar foundations and tasks. 
They also share historical similarities, related to the development of food law, advances 
in scientific knowledge, and the development of techniques for food control and safety 
regulation. For instance, similar national legislation on meat control was established in 
many European countries at the end of the 19th century.  
Understanding the subject that is regulated – in our case food safety – is important in 
order to understand how the field is regulated. This is also important in relation to the 
interpretation of how different agencies operate and are managed. Following Selznick 
and Stinchcombe, understanding the subject of regulation, the tasks valued and upheld 
by the institution is important in order to assess the potential impact of a crisis – 
                                                 
7 The Codex works for the formulation and harmonisation of food standards across the world and has its roots in the 
establishment of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations. 
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especially a crisis of legitimacy, attacking the foundational values the institution 
embodies. By placing public tasks outside the authority of central government (or, in the 
case of the EU: the Commission), it becomes possible to hold the respective agency 
accountable for new food scandals. The creation of separate institutions can therefore 
illustrate a wish for stability and credibility with regard to decision-making. The 
alternative is decision-making by politicians, who might have more temporary agendas. 
The idea of separating administration, scientific risk assessment and policy issues, is 
not unproblematic. Both Rhodes (1996:12) and Vos (2000a:248) argue that 
administration itself can embody policy considerations. The wish to separate policy and 
administration seems an important motivation behind the establishment of agencies. 
However, agencies still make decisions that have important policy implications. The 
separation of policy-making and management is therefore not an easy task. This indeed 
applies to the field of food safety, where consumer interests, agricultural and business 
interests, ethical judgements and scientific considerations often are at odds. 
Joerges et al. (1997) provides insights concerning regulation and decision-making in 
the EU that has important implications for EU food regulation (see also Joerges and 
Neyer 1997, Joerges and Everson 2000). Their insights are relevant at a national level as 
well. They criticize the idea that regulatory policy can be seen as a technocratic concern 
that can be delegated to experts in independent agencies. A central argument is that 
judgments on the acceptability of risk must take into consideration, not just expert 
assessment, but also normative, political and ethical factors. This militates against the 
delegation of this function to bodies of experts (Joerges and Everson 2000:171). It 
forms a direct contrast both to the arguments of the British approach in the Next Steps 
programme, and to those of the EU approach, where the separation of policy and 
administration is emphasised. In agreement with this, Vos pointedly remarks that 
«…risk assessment and management are so complex, uncertain, and controversial that they cannot be 
conducted without reference to normative social values» (Vos 2000a:230). This further applies to 
risk assessment in food safety, where scientific uncertainty or controversy repeatedly 
complicates risk management. 
Despite the many valuable insights in existing agency literature, there is room for 
more research. In general, there are few explicit empirical studies. There is also a lack of 
comparative work. Most authors are taken up with a more fundamental debate about 
what the establishment of agencies means to public administration and management, 
democratic accountability, European integration or Community law. They do not regard 
characteristics of the particular field of regulation in question. In the following, I shall 
examine in detail the establishment of the FSA and EFSA, in an attempt to complement 
existing work. 
The BSE Crisis 
It seems that the BSE crisis is important in explaining the establishment of the two food 
agencies. Food safety regulation concerns crucial state assignments and arrangements, 
and food safety crises therefore are of particular importance. Judging from newspaper 
and media coverage, other food scares such as dioxin in Belgian poultry (in 1999) and 
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food poisoning through salmonella, listeria and E. coli also had an impact on the overall 
confidence crisis in food control in the 1990s. The evolvement of the BSE crisis can be 
seen as a parallel case to that of salmonella in eggs documented by Smith (1991), where 
food policy issues and arrangements became politicized after a long period of 
depolitization. However, frequent references to the BSE case in relevant public 
documents, in newspaper reports and other relevant literature (for instance Grant 1997, 
Joerges and Everson 2000, Majone 2000, Vos 2000a and Vos 2000b) demonstrates that 
the BSE crisis was particularly important, both in intensity and in terms of dispersion. It 
concerned not only questions regarding public health and safety, but also involved trade 
and commercial issues. Furthermore, agriculture and production methods became major 
concerns. It also challenged progress in the EU. Bovens et al. (1998) emphasize the 
severity of the crisis by characterizing BSE as a political and a programme failure.8 Boin 
and t’Hart (2003) sees it as a crisis of significant scope and importance, with a significant 
reform craft. Millstone and van Zwanenberg (2002) characterizes it as the most 
challenging of a series of food scares since the early 1980s, and as a defining watershed 
in reforming food policy in the UK, the EU as well as on a global level. 
BSE became a significant crisis not just because of the frightening nature of the 
disease itself, and the fact that it could spread to humans. It became a crisis of 
significant proportion because of the way it was handled by governing institutions. BSE 
was first discovered in Great Britain in 1986. Through the 1980s and 1990s the disease 
developed into an epidemic, spreading to more and more herds and farms.9 The rapid 
spread of the disease was linked to the practice of using rendered cattle in feed. Up until 
1996, the British government denied a possible link between BSE and the similar human 
brain disease nvCJD. This can be related to an interest in reassuring concerned domestic 
consumers, as well as foreign trading partners. In March 1996, the authorities changed 
their position, now acknowledging that there was a possible link between the diseases 
after all. This prompted massive media attention, both nationally and in Europe, and led 
to serious criticism of the government and of food control mechanisms.10 In the years 
that followed, several reports, papers and legal texts on the organisation and principles 
of food safety and regulation were published. A public Inquiry was set up in 1998 to 
review the British governmental actions in response to the BSE prior to 1996 (BSE 
Inquiry Report 2000). The «lessons to be learned» were apparently plentiful (ibid: 
chapter 14, vol. 1). From the publication of the first report on the FSA (James 1997) it 
was only two years before the agency was operative. Similarly, only two years separate 
                                                 
8 This occurs when a strategy or policy fails to have the desired impact and produces unwanted effects (programme 
failure), and when it lacks political support and momentum necessary for its survival (political failure) (Bovens et al 
1998:196). 
9 By the time that BSE was identified as a disease as many as 50,000 cattle are likely to have been infected (BSE 
Inquiry 2000, vol. 1, chapter 1). 
10 Evidence on this can be found in several special reports on the mad cow crisis, for example: BBC News: «BSE and 
CJD Crisis Chronology» (www.news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/health/2000/bse/default.stm) The 
Guardian: «Special report BSE Crisis» (www.guardian.co.uk/bse/0,8250,388290,00.html)  and CNN: «Mad Cow 
In-depth Special»  (http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2000/madcow/) 
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the first formal proposal for the establishment of the European agency (COM (99) 719) 
and its establishment in 2002. 
Wyn Grant refers to the BSE crisis in Britain as «…a clear example of a policy disaster», 
partly caused by tensions between the Department of Health (DoH) and the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) (Grant 1997:346). It also had implications for 
British EU relations, and for co-operation within the community. This is made clear in 
the British BSE Inquiry report (2000) and in the corresponding BSE Inquiry conducted 
by the EU (EP 1997). Vos (2000a:227) agrees that the spread of the disease into Europe 
resulted in widespread public distrust in how the Commission functioned. This in turn 
prompted drastic reform (ibid. 228). Majone argues that the BSE crisis not only revealed 
a failure to establish a credible community of scientific experts on food safety, but also 
exposed serious shortcomings in the overall co-ordination of European policies on 
agriculture, the internal market and human health (Majone 2000:282). Baggott (1998) 
has pointed out that an important factor was that BSE was initially defined as a problem 
of agriculture rather than as one of health. This defined the problem in a certain way 
and structured the solutions sought. The problem was gradually defined more as a 
question of public health and safety. And as the health departments in different 
countries and in the EU became more involved, the nature of solutions shifted. 
Evidently, BSE had important implications for policymaking both at national and 
EU level. In the EU, the crisis had a double impact. It hit the very foundations of the 
European community – that of trade between member states. Furthermore, it surfaced 
just when the EU was holding a summit conference to revise the Maastricht Treaty – 
the agreement that had formally established the Internal Market. In response to the 
recognition of the risks relating to the spread of the disease, the EU issued a ban on the 
export of British beef. The British government argued they had taken the necessary 
steps to stop the spread of BSE, and reacted by obstructing decision-making on all 
matters requiring unanimity at the EU summit. According to reports in the periodical 
European Dialogue11, this seriously hampered progress at the summit, thereby stimulating 
a debate on the principle of unanimous voting within the community (European 
Dialogue 1996:5). This illustrates that food safety is of such value and importance to 
society that a crisis can have wider institutional implications and prompt policy and 
institutional changes, even beyond the policy field in question. 
Several parallel documents were published in Great Britain and in the EU in 
response to the BSE crisis. The most significant ones form the basis of the following 
analysis. Table 1 «Milestones in the emergence of FSA and EFSA» summarises the 
events and the documents explored, and illustrates how interrelated the changes in 
Great Britain and the EU have been. 
The following analysis emphasises the main events and actors in the process of 
establishing the agencies. The main aim is to look into what motivations guided the 
establishment of the agencies, and what solutions were sought in order to restore 
confidence in policy and regulation. This will be followed by a discussion of how the 
                                                 
11 European Dialogue is a magazine published by the EU Commission, Directorate General for Information. 
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establishment of the two agencies can be accounted for in terms of the argued 
institutional approach and the agency literature reviewed above. 
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Table 1. Milestones in the emergence of FSA and EFSA. 
 Food Standards Agency / Great Britain European Food Safety Authority / EU 
1986 
 
The mad cow disease in cattle 
(BSE) discovered 
 
1996 
The link between BSE and nvCJD 
discovered  
EU ban on British beef 
1997 
The James Report on the Food 
Standards Agency (James 1997) 
 
The BSE Inquiry launched in 
December  
Report on the alleged contraventions or 
maladministration in the implementation of Community 
law in relation to BSE (A4-0020/97) 
 
Speech to European Parliament by Jaques Santer 
(Speech/97/39) 
 
Communication on Consumer Health and Food Safety 
(COM (97) 183) 
 
Commission Green Paper on Food Law (COM (97) 176) 
1998 
Government White Paper: «The 
Food Standards Agency – a Force 
for Change»  
Communication on Veterinary and Plant Health Control 
and Inspection (COM (98) 32) 
1999 
Food Standards Bill 
 
Food Standards Act 1999  
The James, Kemper and Pascal Report: «A European 
Food and Public Health Authority. The future of 
scientific advice in the EU» (James et. al. 1999)  
2000 
The Food Standards Agency 
established in April 
 
The BSE Inquiry publishes its 
report 
Commission White Paper on Food Safety (COM (99) 
719) 
 
COM (00) 716: Proposal for a Regulation laying down 
the genral principles and requirements of food law, 
establishing the European Food Authority, and laying 
down procedures in matters of food 
2001  
Amended regulation on the  European Food Authority 
(COM (01) 475) 
2002  
Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 
laying down the general principles and requirements of 
food law, establishing the European Food Safety 
Authority and laying down procedures in matters of 
food safety 
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The Food Standards Agency 
Shortly after the BSE crisis set off, the Labour leader Tony Blair ordered a report on the 
establishment of a British food agency. Professor Phillip James of the Rowett Research 
Institute in Aberdeen was appointed to lead the work. He had been a prominent figure 
in British food policy for some time, having advised governments on several issues 
concerning food safety since the early 1980s (Cannon 1987:18, 35–36). The ‘James 
report’ on the Food Standards Agency was published in 1997, after a broad round of 
consultation with public and private interests (James 1997). According to the report, 
British food policy was faced with a serious loss of confidence, due to a culture of 
administrative secrecy, conflicts between public and vested interests, and a lack of 
coordination in existing food control mechanisms (ibid. 5). The proposed solution was 
to establish an independent agency with executive powers and consumer and other 
public interest involvement (ibid. 16–18).  
Despite the emphasis on independence, the agency would not be entirely separate 
from central authorities. It was to report to parliament through health ministers (ibid. 
27). Responsibility for food safety at the central level was formerly divided between 
MAFF and the DoH. MAFF largely took care of food standards (quality and 
composition), chemical safety, labelling, and food technology, including additives, 
contaminants and the hygiene aspects of dairy and meat production. The DoH had 
responsibility for health aspects of food, including food hygiene, microbiological food 
safety and nutrition (James 1997:11–13). Conflict between agriculture and health 
departments was evident. With the reorganisation proposed in the James report, food 
policy and food regulation would be firmly established as a public health concern, 
separated from agriculture departments and central government. ‘Independence’ from 
agricultural and business interests and from central government was seen as the key to 
restoring public confidence. A principle of viewing food control as a specific public 
health concern has a long history (Elvbakken 1997). With the restructuring for the 
British food policy field this principle was accordingly re-emphasised. 
The proposed agency was to advise ministers on food safety and regulation and to 
coordinate research in food safety, nutrition and consumer protection (ibid. 24). The 
advantage of including nutrition policy within the agency’s remit was emphasized (ibid. 
10). The report also stressed the importance of taking notice of consumer interests (ibid. 
10). It envisaged an organisation governed by a multi-member board, where most 
members would be nominated by public interest groups (ibid. 16).  
After victory in the general election in 1997, Labour treated the establishment of the 
Food Standards Agency as an important priority. A government White Paper was 
published in January 1998. It supported the main conclusions of the James report 
(White Paper 1998: 2). Consumer confidence, independence and the responsibility of 
the DoH continued to be central idioms. The two documents nevertheless diverged on 
some points. The James report had envisaged strong agency involvement in nutrition 
policy. This was toned down in the White Paper. Instead, a split of responsibilities 
between the agency and DoH was suggested (ibid. 32–33). The aspect of significant 
consumer involvement was also downplayed, although the importance of the board 
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members’ independence was still emphasised. The White Paper further emphasised an 
‘integrated approach’ to questions of risk management and risk assessment. Scientific 
risk assessment and risk management were seen as two inseparable questions, whereas 
the agency would formulate policy, have regulatory tasks and integrate scientific 
expertise (ibid. 2). After a widely publicised hearing, a bill establishing the Food 
Standards Agency was laid before Parliament and publicly distributed. Despite disputes 
concerning funding and the agency’s involvement in nutritional issues, the Food 
Standards Act was passed in November 1999 without significant differences from the 
proposals in the bill.  
The FSA was established in April 2000. It was ultimately designed with powers in its 
own right; not only would it deal with matters of risk assessment, it would also possess 
regulatory powers. The latter allows it to issue general codes of practice and audit local 
public health authorities responsible for food control. It was also made responsible for 
the Meat Hygiene Services performing meat control. Furthermore, it was to provide 
information to the public and advise central authorities. Still, important regulatory 
powers remained with the Ministry (DoH). The responsibilities of MAFF were on the 
other hand minimized. 
The ‘Guiding Principles’ of the Food Standards Agency demonstrate central 
motivations behind the establishment of the FSA (White Paper 1998:5). According to 
the White Paper, the essential aim of the Agency is «…the protection of public health in 
relation to food» (ibid.). This principle involves a dual motivation: to secure adequate 
protection for the consumer and to support honest producers and retailers in the 
market, thereby providing protection for the market itself. This dual motivation 
characterizes food control in general, and is identified and discussed by Elvbakken in 
her work on Norwegian food control (Elvbakken 1997). 
Three further objectives are central to the foundations of the agency. These include 
independence, scientific excellence and transparency. They imply that risk assessment will be 
«…unbiased and based on the best available scientific advice» (White Paper 1998:5). The agency 
will further act «…at arm’s length from Government and independent of specific sectoral interests» 
(ibid. 1997:1). The agency’s independence is ensured by its right to freely publish its 
advice (Food Standards Act 1999: article 19). This implies independence from both 
vested interests and from central authorities perceived to be more directly involved in 
policy decisions. The ideal of separating policy and management issues, frequently 
referred to in literature, is obviously important. Independence seems to be the keyword 
in trying to ensure a form of neutrality or objectivity in order to secure public 
confidence. However, as discussed this is a problematical goal, involving conflicting 
priorities and value-based considerations. 
Transparency, openness and consultation are elements used to assure public 
involvement (White Paper 1998:5), and can be seen as ways to ensure confidence in 
decision-making. The recognition of public involvement demonstrates a fundamental 
acceptance of diverse interests. This could conflict with the agency’s desired 
independence, and could result in a rather ambiguous approach. On the other hand, the 
inclusion of other ‘interested parties’ opens up for an understanding of risk regulation as 
something more than a mere neutral technocratic or scientific question. In effect, other 
values and interests are recognised as important to the regulation of food safety as well. 
WORKING PAPER  15  –  2004 FOOD SAFETY AT  STAKE  … 
20 
This agrees with Joerges et al. (1997) and Vos (2000a): Separating risk assessment and 
risk management in order to preclude policy-based decisions is a difficult – if not 
impossible – operation. The inclusion of ‘other interests’ also takes heed of Selznick’s 
argument, that regulation involves socially valued activities. 
Despite its alleged importance, the independence principle might be further 
compromised by the structure of the agency. FSA staff are legally civil servants, and as 
such a part of central administration (FSA 2000). Although the agency is a separate 
administrative body, employees are still governed by the same rules and incorporated 
values as other civil servants, and in general they are often recruited from central 
administration. Largely, FSA staff was former employed either in MAFF or DoH.12 
They could transfer dominant practices and values from their former departments, and 
have loyalties towards their former work-place that can compromise the independence 
ideal. Furthermore, members of the agency’s board are appointed by the secretary of 
state for health and by the regional assemblies of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland 
(Food Standards Act 1999: Article 2). This secures a regional element which continues 
to be important in British policy, and implies that regional considerations are legitimate 
in decision-making within the agency. Individual board members are also chosen for 
their diverse relations to different segments of the food industry and food safety 
regulation area, and include members from various segments of society, ranging from 
academia to the food business sector.13 This could further compromise the interest of 
operating independently from sectoral interests. Finally, none of the agency’s advisory 
committees are composed exclusively of scientists.14 They include academics as well as 
representatives from industry and law-enforcement bodies, consumers and other non-
specialists. A tentative conclusion is that it is difficult for the agency to be completely 
independent of central authority or of ‘other interested parties’, even though members 
are not directly representatives of any organisation or sector.  
An important question is whether complete independence actually is possible – or 
feasible. The integrated approach – involving ‘other interested parties’ in management 
and decision-making – might be characteristic of the British approach to public policy. 
It represents an important recognition of diverse interests in potentially conflicting 
policy areas. On the other hand, the mingling of interests, scientific judgement and 
policy considerations may also complicate decision-making.  
The European Food Safety Authority 
The food sector is an area of regulation that dates back to the earliest days of the 
European community. The form, direction and goals of food regulation in the EU have 
                                                 
12 Interview with informants in MAFF and DoH 1999 and in FSA 2000. 
13 A detailed presentation of the board members and their interests is published on the Food Standards Agency’s 
website: http://www.food.gov.uk/aboutus/ourboard/boardmem/?version=1 
14 Sectoral connections of members of the individual advisory committees in the Food Standards Agency are made 
public at the Food Standards Agency’s website: http://www.food.gov.uk/science/ouradvisors/?version=1  
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changed significantly over time. It started off as provisions necessary to fulfil the 
harmonization goals of a common market, but over the years came to form a policy goal 
in its own right, which ultimately aims at ensuring safe food for European consumers 
(Hellebø 1999). A parallel shift in regulation away from efforts to approximate national 
legislation (vertical regulation) to a more widespread use of horizontal framework 
regulation has been described by Hellebø (1999) and Jukes (1995). 
Important changes in the EU were triggered by BSE, although in this case it took 
longer before they were embodied in an agency (Table 1). As in Britain, EU institutions 
– in particular the Commission – were criticised for their handling of BSE. This was 
made public by a temporary European Parliament committee set up to report on «…the 
alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of Community law in relation to 
BSE» (EP 1997). A debate on BSE and the inquiry committee report was held in the 
European Parliament in February 1997. Jaques Santer (president of the Commission) 
held a speech in which he answered some of the criticisms that were raised. Here, the 
establishment of an independent agency, based on the «…positive aspects of the United States 
Food and Drugs Administration» (Santer 1997), was proposed for the first time. The United 
States Food and Drug Administration (US FDA) can be characterised as a regulatory 
agency. This implies that it is responsible for enforcement and monitoring tasks, as well 
as educational tasks.15 Thus it is more powerful than traditional EU agencies and many 
national European agencies. The realisation of Santer’s proposal would imply a break 
with the existing agency approach, characterised by weaker, information-based agencies 
as described by Majone (1997), Kreher (1997), Dehousse (1997) and Shapiro (1997). 
In 1997 a number of institutional reforms were agreed upon in a Communication on 
Consumer Health and Food Safety (COM (97) 183). Responsibility for food safety was 
transferred within the Commission from the Directorate Generals of Agriculture and 
Industry to a reformed Directorate General for Consumer Policy and Health (DG 
Sanco). This reflected the need to establish food safety matters as a public health 
concern separated from commercial agricultural interests, similar to developments in 
Britain a few years later, and – importantly – in agreement with the historically based 
tradition of seeing food control as a public health issue. An inspection office under the 
Commission, responsible for overseeing member state implementation of European 
food legislation, was set up. Here, a principle of separating scientific advice and control 
activities from legislative functions was emphasised. With the establishment of the Food 
and Veterinary Office (FVO), further attention was attracted to divergencies in 
regulation and food control in the member states. The establishment of the FVO is 
therefore also an important prelude to the establishment of EFSA. 
A Commission Green Paper on «The General Principles of Food Law in the European 
Union» was laid before the European Parliament and the member states two months 
after Santer’s speech (COM (97) 176). This was the first major policy document to 
review the totality of food regulation and control in the EU, and it anticipated the 
establishment of a general food law within the EU. Aspects including both regulation 
and control were discussed, and issues concerning proper risk assessment were essential. 
                                                 
15 The tasks and responsibilities of the US FDA are described at the agency’s website: www.fda.gov  
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It balanced different goals that can be seen as at least partly conflicting: To ensure a 
high level of consumer protection, while at the same time securing the internal market 
and the competetiveness of European industry (COM (97) 176:3). These potentially 
conflicting goals continue to influence discussions on food safety within the EU. 
Although the Green Paper did not specificly suggest the establishment of a new food 
agency, it was an important framework for the following development and the eventual 
establishment of EFSA. A widespread hearing in the member states revealed major 
support for a change in the organisation and regulation of food safety in the EU. 
In 1999, the Commission invited professors Pascal, Kemper and James (the same 
James who was involved in the British case) to produce an «independent report on the 
future of scientific advice in the EU» (James et al. 1999).16 They re-launched the debate 
on a food agency in the EU, by recommending the establishment of an independent 
Food and Health Authority. The proposed structure was, once again, an independent 
authority analogous to the US FDA, albeit «…more independent of political and industrial 
interests» (ibid. 7). As in the British case, the restoration of public confidence was a major 
concern (ibid. 13). The failure of the EU was related to what was seen as an artificial 
separation of risk assessment, risk communication and risk management (ibid. 9, 14). 
The advantage of incorporating the three aspects of risk analysis, as had been done in 
the British case (the ‘integrated approach’), was emphasised. The proposed authority 
was to concentrate on tasks concerning scientific advice, the monitoring of public 
health, policy analysis, research policy development, communication, and crisis 
management (EU Commission 1999: IP/99/973).  
As in the James report, the Commission envisaged significant involvement of public 
interest groups. It also emphasised direct accountability to elected representatives in the 
European Parliament (ibid. 19). The realisation of the proposed Food and Health 
Authority would, as Buonanno et al. (2001) point out, break new ground in the 
development of the EU, and for the first time remove the control function for a social 
policy from the Commission and from the domain of the member states. This would be 
a definite step towards further European integration. As in Santer’s proposal, the agency 
would differ from the weaker, more information-based agencies established directly 
under Commission control. 
The EU Green Paper (COM (97) 176) and the James, Kemper and Pascal report 
were followed by a White Paper on Food Safety in January 2000 (COM (99) 719), which 
proposed the establishment of EFSA. However, the proposed agency would be limited 
in scope compared to the agency suggested by the professors, and more in tune with the 
prevailing EU agency model. The White Paper specifically rejected the idea that the 
agency should be responsible for risk management, which might otherwise result in 
«…possible dilution of democratic accountability, breach with the designated responsibilities of the 
Commission, and possible violation of Treaty provisions regarding the institutional arrangements of the 
European Union» (ibid. 15). The separation of risk management from risk assessment 
differs from the integrated approach in Britain. At the same time it agrees with existing 
                                                 
16 The three authors were all members of the Scientific Steering Committee, sorting under the Directorate general for 
Health and Consumer Protection of the European Commission. 
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EU institutional arrangements. Presumably then, existing institutional arrangements in 
the EU had an important say in the way the agency was structured in the end. 
In November 2000 a regulation proposal followed the White Paper (COM (2000) 
716). In general it followed the suggestions of the White Paper: to establish a European 
food agency with responsibility limited to risk assessment (scientific advice, monitoring 
and research) and risk communication. An amended proposal was published in August 
2001 (COM (2001) 475), and in January 2002 a regulation establishing the authority was 
adopted (Regulation No 178/2002). Only minor adjustments were made along the way. 
In principle the final regulation followed the main lines of the White Paper. The 
principle of separating risk assessment (in the Agency) and risk management (in the 
Commission) was firmly established. The agency was set up provisionaly in Brussels in 
2002, while disputes concerning the permanent location continued. Finally, a Council 
decision late 2003 decided on Parma, Italy (EFSA 2003). 
The regulation establishing EFSA has its basis in central objectives that also formally 
guide the overall approach of European food law, and which are clear in several of the 
regulation’s articles (articles 1, 5, 8 and 22). These articles might serve as indications of 
the main aims and motivations guiding the new agency. They express a dual aim 
corresponding to that of the British case: to protect public health and secure safe food 
on the one hand, and to ensure the operation of the (internal) market on the other. 
Thus, this dual aim is a central aspect of food safety regulation in general, as well as 
apparent in most of the underlying documents on food regulation in the EU. 
An objective of securing the internal market (article 1) can be seen as serving further 
European integration, through a harmonisation of national mechanisms. This seems to 
be an important motivation behind the establishment of EFSA, in addition to the 
primary interest of ensuring safe food. The prominence of this aim is evident also in the 
opening statement of the regulation establishing EFSA: «The free movement of food and feed 
within the Community can be achieved only if food and feed safety requirements do not differ significantly 
from Member State to Member State» (Regulation (EC) No 178/2002: point 3). The interest 
in furthering European integration is also evident by the establishment of a network of 
food experts within the framework of the European Union. Article 22 (2) states that 
«…the Authority shall provide scientific advice and scientific and technical support for the Community».  
The regulation further prescribes that EFSA shall consist of a scientific committee 
and permanent scientific panels (article 28). Until today, food experts have mainly 
participated in the EU through scientific and advisory committees adjoined to the 
Commission. This is accounted for by for instance Joerges et al. (1997), Joerges and 
Everson (2000) and Vos (2000a). With the establishment of EFSA, scientific experts in 
the EU will participate in a more permanent structure detached from Commission 
activity. This organisation might prove an important counterweight against competing 
scientific and political judgments in other major trading countries – for instance the US. 
Restoring consumer confidence in the aftermath of the BSE crisis is important in the EU – 
as it is in the British case. This is amply expressed in all the EU documents listed in table 
1. In the introduction on the regulation proposal the phrase ‘consumer confidence’ is 
used no less than 11 times (COM (00) 716: 5–25). Consumer confidence is also central 
in the final adopted regulation (Regulation (EC) No 178/2002: points 9, 22, 23, 35 and 
40). On the one hand, consumer confidence means confidence in food, food 
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production and the food trade. But it also implies confidence in European food 
regulation and relevant institutions, and the capabilities and effectiveness of EU 
institutions in general. The centrality of ensuring confidence further emphasises the 
value of food safety in governmental activity and society at large, and is vital in securing 
the internal market. 
The main instruments in EU food regulation mentioned are scientific excellence, 
independence and transparency (COM (00) 716 final: 13–14). Again, this mirrors the 
phrasing of the documents establishing the FSA. And, as in the British case, independence 
is central. Thus, the classic doctrine of separating policy and management is present 
here as well. But independence in what way? The regulation (Regulation (EC) No 
178/2002) includes specific articles on independence (article 37) and transparency 
(article 38). The agency is to operate independently of the Commission as well as of 
perceived vested interests. Nevertheless, complete independence of action is difficult to 
achieve. The Authority’s management board includes a representative from the 
Commission, and have members with backgrounds in consumer affairs and industry, as 
well as from national ministries and food control authorities (Press release IP/01/1789, 
Regulation (EC) No 178/2002: article 25). EFSA’s Advisory Forum consists of 
members from competent bodies in each of the member states (COM (00) 716 final: 49, 
Regulation (EC) No 178/2002: article 27). This secures an intergovernmental element, 
which is important throughout the structure of the European Union. It might on the 
other hand influence members, compromising their independence. Scientific 
committees that earlier operated within the Commission (DG Sanco) were transferred 
to the new agency. Their close relations with the Commission and their experience of its 
ways of ‘thinking and acting’ are likely to have impact on decisions within the new 
agency. The structure of the agency and the members it incorporates are not chosen by 
chance. Earlier and existing institutional arrangements influence the way the new agency 
is organized. We can assume that administrative cultures and values are carried on by 
the people inhabiting the new agency. These factors can also be observed in the British 
case. 
In one way EFSA achieves the desired split between risk assessment and risk 
management, insofar as its scope of operation covers risk assessment and risk 
communication only. This differs from the British ‘integrated approach’ whereas the 
FSA incorporates regulative tasks as well. However, by involving national 
representatives and former representatives of consumer groups and industry, other 
interests than those based solely on scientific judgements are included. This might bring 
the overall EU approach closer to the British ‘integrated approach’ after all, even though 
the EU’s rhetoric on the importance of separating policy, regulation and scientific risk 
assessment in the policy documents studied here, is more explicit. 
Discussion 
A historical institutional approach focuses attention on institutions and their formation 
through time. Selznick’s approach to institutions and his definition of regulation 
(Selznick 1985) has inspired a focus on the motivations ruling the creation of two new 
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food agencies: EFSA and the FSA. Historical institutionalists have been criticised for 
being focused on continuity rather than change. However, Thelen and Steinmo (1992) 
introduce a concept of ‘institutional dynamism’, encouraging studies looking at how 
institutions embedded in history might change. In this article, I have emphasised both 
continuity and change. With the creation of EFSA and the FSA, new organisations have 
been established making way for changes in policy. At the same time, food safety 
regulation constitutes a particular policy field with a long tradition that continues to 
influence it. Food safety is an essential task for any government, and has a particular 
value involving confidence in and legitimacy of governing institutions. The importance 
of food policy is illustrated by the continuous dominance of the dual aim in food 
control: securing safe food for the consumer and protecting the market and the honest 
producer or tradesman. It concerns public health as well as order at the marketplace.  
The events within the field of food policy in the aftermath of BSE illustrated that 
institutions, although embedded in historical traditions, are not unchangeable. At the 
same time solutions sought are not chosen without reference to previous or existing 
arrangements. BSE spurred ‘institutional dynamism’ in the field of food policy, and 
changes took place within different national and institutional settings. From there 
followed both similarities and differences in outcome. The analysis of the events in 
Britain and in the EU shows similar paths and different choices at the same time. 
BSE prompted serious criticism of the ways in which food regulation was organised. 
The crisis exposed conflict between health and agricultural departments of government, 
and challenged co-operation within the EU. Relations between expert advisors and 
policy-makers and between control institutions and central government were 
questioned. With the organisational changes following, food safety has been (re-) 
established as an important public health concern distinctly separated from commercial 
and agricultural interests.  
The centrality of restoring consumer confidence is demonstrated by the speed of 
events, and underlined in the policy documents analysed. Both agencies were created 
within two years. A similar procedure was followed in both cases. The publication of 
several policy documents ensured a broad debate before legislation was set forth. 
Independent expert reports laid the groundwork for further discussions. Even some of 
the same people were involved in the two processes. The creation of the agencies was 
further influenced by existing theories on public management and policy; separating 
policy and management issues in order to enhance accountability and confidence in 
decision-making authorities.  
Consumer confidence was the key term in both settings, to be secured through 
‘independence, scientific excellence and transparency’. The independence ideal can be 
linked to an interest in detaching food policy from the influence of vested interests and 
to re-establish it within the public health field. It can also be related to a desire to 
separate policy and management issues, frequently referred to in relevant literature on 
the subject of public agencies. The quest for scientific excellence further reflects a high 
regard for expert and scientific judgments – despite earlier experiences of conflicting 
expert assessments and uncertain scientific results. Reliance on scientific expertise alone 
is however problematic. Food safety regulation is a complex matter that also involves 
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normative social values, judgements based on ethics, and policy considerations that 
surpass strictly scientific assessments. 
The agency literature shows that agencies can be difficult to capture analytically. A 
working definition based on the criteria of Pollitt and Talbot (2004) is useful. By 
restricting the study to food agencies, we can examine a particular field of regulation and 
a specific valued task embodied within the organisation. Agencies within the same field 
of regulation may vary in terms of remit, organization, independence, approach and 
input (groups of actors within the organization). At the same time, similarities can be 
attributed to attachment to the particular policy field. Differences between the agencies 
can at least in some part be related to differences of context and institutional settings, 
traceable to choices made earlier in the history of the food policy field. Existing and past 
institutional arrangements influence future adjustments.  
While previous arrangements are important in order to understand regulation in a 
particular policy field, deep-rooted crises can indulge important institutional changes 
and direct institutionalized arrangements, traditions and values into new channels. BSE 
was such a crisis. Taken together, this can explain how the two agencies were set up, and 
the structures chosen for them. The establishment of the two agencies show variations 
related to their different institutional settings. EFSA surfaced with restricted powers in 
terms of regulative authority compared to initial proposals. Its main functions are 
related to scientific risk assessment. Food control is still the responsibility of member 
states. The existing structure and division of powers in the EU, between EU institutions 
and member states, and between the Commission responsible for policy issues and 
other bodies designed for management purposes, proved to be a strong model for the 
new agency. The structure of the British administration allowed for a stronger agency 
including regulatory tasks. FSA was set up as an independent agency, but placed under 
the Department of Health. Here, previous arrangements, such as the organisation of the 
scientific committees as well as regional representation have survived within the new 
organisation. In both cases the recruitment of people from bodies formerly responsible 
for food safety issues or from other bodies of central administration might indicate 
transference of existing values and practices from other government bodies. Whether 
the alleged independence of the agencies creates new practices and cultures, or 
reproduces old problems remains to be seen. 
In sum, the solutions sought in the establishment of both agencies reflect an interest 
in changing institutions, but at the same time represent extensions of existing 
institutional arrangements and traditions. This shows the advantage of a historical 
institutional approach incorporating openness for mechanisms of institutional and 
political change. 
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